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Abstract—In WiFi networks, mobile nodes compete
for accessing a shared channel by means of a random
access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF). Although this protocol is in principle fair, since
all the stations have the same probability to transmit
on the channel, it has been shown that unfair behaviors
may emerge in actual networking scenarios because of
non-standard configurations of the nodes. Due to the
proliferation of open source drivers and programmable
cards, enabling an easy customization of the channel access
policies, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of random
access schemes. Assuming that each node is rational and
implements a best response strategy, we show that efficient
equilibria conditions can be reached when stations are
interested in both uploading and downloading traffic.
More interesting, these equilibria are reached when all the
stations play the same strategy, thus guaranteeing a fair
resource sharing. When stations are interested in upload
traffic only, we also propose a mechanism design, based
on an artificial dropping of layer-2 acknowledgments, to
force desired equilibria. Finally, we propose and evaluate
some simple DCF extensions for practically implementing
our theoretical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of resource sharing in WiFi net-
works [1], [2], is addressed by the Distributed Co-
ordination Function (DCF), which is a Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) protocol based on the paradigm
of carrier sense multiple access with collision avoid-
ance (CSMA/CA). The basic idea of the protocol is
very simple: sensing the channel before transmit-
ting, and waiting for a random backoff time when
the channel is sensed busy. This random delay, intro-
duced for preventing collisions among waiting sta-
tions, is slotted for efficiency reason and extracted
in a range called contention window. Standard DCF
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assumes that the contention window is set to a
minimum value (CWmin) at the first transmission
attempt and is doubled up to a maximum value
(CWmax) after each transmission failure.
The distributed DCF protocol is in principle fair,
because the contention window settings CWmin and
CWmax are homogeneous among the stations, thus
ensuring that each node receives in long term the
same number of access opportunities. Nevertheless,
some unexpected behaviors have been recognized
as a consequence of non-standard settings of the
contention windows. In fact, stations employing
lower contention windows gain probabilistically a
higher number of transmission opportunities, at the
expense of compliant stations. These settings can be
performed by the card manufacturers, as recognized
in [3], or by the end users thanks to the availability
of open-source drivers.
Another problem specific to infrastructure net-
works is given by the repartition between uplink
and downlink resources. Infrastructure networks are
characterized by a star topology, which connects
multiple mobile nodes to a common station called
Access Point (AP). On one side, mobile stations
can upload traffic to the AP, which is connected to
external networks (e.g. to the internet); on the other
side, they can download traffic from the external
networks through the AP. Since the AP contends as
a normal station to the channel, its channel access
probability is the same of other mobile stations.
This implies that the AP aggregated throughput, i.e.
the downlink bandwidth, is equal to the throughput
perceived by all the other stations, thus resulting
in a per-station downlink bandwidth much lower
than the uplink one [4]. Indeed, recent extensions
of DCF [5] (namely, the EDCA protocol) allow the
AP to set heterogeneous contention windows among
the stations to give priority to downlink throughput
or to delay-sensitive traffic. Thus, nowadays nodes
can adapt their contention windows according to the
values signaled by the AP for each traffic class.
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2However, there is the risk to exploit this adapta-
tion in a selfish manner, for example by using a
contention window value of an higher priority class
[6].
These considerations motivate a game theoretical
analysis of DCF, in order to propose some protocol
extensions able to cope with the current resource
sharing problems. The problem can be formulated
as a non cooperative game, in which the contending
stations act as the players of the game. When sta-
tions work in saturation conditions, i.e. they always
have a packet available in the transmission buffer,
DCF can be modeled as a slotted access protocol,
while station behavior can be summarized in terms
of per-slot access probability [7].
Let τi be the per-slot access probability repre-
senting the access strategy of a generic station i.
The channel access game can be formulated by
considering: n players, the set of strategies τ =
(τi, i = 1, . . . , n) in [0, 1]n, and the station payoff
(J1, J2, . . . , Jn), that can be defined according to
the network and application scenario [8]. Previous
studies have mainly considered that such a utility is
given by the node upload throughput performance
[9]. In [10], it has been shown that a utility func-
tion equal to the upload throughput may lead to
an inefficient Nash equilibrium in which stations
transmit in every channel slot (i.e. play τ = 1).
This situation creates a resource collapse, because
all stations transmit simultaneously thus destroy-
ing all packet transmissions. More complex utility
functions combining upload throughput and costs
related to collision rates [10], [11], [12] or to energy
consumptions [13], [14] lead to different equilibria,
but they implicitly assume that all the nodes have
the same energy constraints or collision costs. Other
utility functions, which lead to efficient equilibria,
appear less natural [15], because they are not related
to physical parameters, such as throughput.
In this paper, we show that efficient equilibria
conditions can be naturally reached when stations
are interested in both upload and download traffic.
Since the utility of each station depends not only
on its throughput but also on the AP throughput,
no station is motivated to transmit continuously.
We propose a game theoretic analysis of DCF in
infrastructure networks, when all the stations have a
desired ratio between uplink and downlink through-
put. Assuming that each station tunes its access
probability according to a best response strategy,
extending our preliminary results in [16] and in
[17], we derive Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal
conditions as a function of the network scenario.
We also define a mechanism design scheme, in
which the AP plays the role of arbitrator to im-
prove the global performance of the network, by
forcing desired equlibria conditions. We propose to
extend current DCF operation by implementing our
theoretical best response strategies. To this purpose,
we develop some channel monitoring functionalities
(similarly to [18], [19]), devised to estimate the
network status and to run-time drive the strategy
adaptations. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness
of our scheme by means of extensive simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In section II we carry the game theoretic analysis
and we find the Nash equilibria and the Pareto
Optimal solutions; in section III we design the
DCF extension; in section IV we show the MAC
scheme implementation and the performance eval-
uation trough simulations; finally we drew some
conclusive remarks in section V.
II. CONTENTION-BASED CHANNEL ACCESS: A
GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
We assume that all the stations try permanently
to transmit on the channel, i.e. they work in sat-
uration conditions. In fact, we have verified that
non-saturated stations affect the performance of
saturated stations only marginally and regardless
of their contention windows. When all stations are
saturated, it has been shown [20] that DCF can
be accurately approximated as a persistent slotted
access protocol, because packet transmissions can
be originated only at given time instants. Figure 1
shows an example of DCF as a slotted protocol.
After a busy time, stations A and B defer their
transmissions by extracting a random slotted delay
(respectively, 4 and 8 slots). Since station A expires
its backoff first, it acquires the right to transmit on
the channel. The next transmission, which results
in a collision, is performed again after an integer
number of backoff slots from the end of the previous
channel activity. Therefore, the channel time can be
divided into slots of uneven duration delimited by
potential transmission instants. In a generic channel
slot, each station has approximately a fixed proba-
bility τ to transmit (in the example, 1/5 for station
A and 1/10 for station B)), which depends on the
average backoff values.
3A. Station strategies
Let n be the number of saturated contending sta-
tions. We assume that each station i is rational, and
can arbitrarily choose its channel access probability
τi in [0, 1]. This choice can be readily implemented
by tuning opportunistically the minimum and the
maximum values of the contention windows. By
observing that τi = 1/(1 + E[W ]/2), where E[W ]
is the average contention window used by station, a
solution is to set CW imin = CW
i
max = 2/τi − 2.
The set of all the strategies in the network is then
[0, 1]n. We define an outcome of the game a specific
set of strategies taken by the players, then a vector
τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τn) ∈ [0, 1]n. We define that an
outcome is homogeneous whenever all the stations
play the same strategy, i.e. τ = (τ, τ, ...τ).
Being all the player requirements homogeneous,
the equilibria we are going to define are invariant
to player permutations. For this reason we define
two outcomes τa and τ b equivalent if they can be
obtained one from the other through an opportune
permutation of the indexes and we write τa ∼ τ b.
We denote a class of equivalent outcomes as {τ˜},
where τ˜ is an ordered vector, i.e. a vector with
increasing component (τ˜1 ≤ τ˜2 ≤ · · · τ˜n). If A is a
set of ordered vectors, then {A} denotes the union
of the classes of equivalence of the vectors in A.
Performance perceived by a given station i not
only depends on the probability τi to access the
channel, but also on the probability that no other
station interferes on the same slot. Therefore, from
the point of view of station i, the vector strategy τ
can be represented by the couple of values (τi, pi),
where pi = 1 −
∏
j 6=i(1 − τj), the probability that
at least another station transmits, summarizes the
interactions with all the other mobile stations.
In presence of downlink traffic, we also assume
that the AP contends for the channel as a legacy
DCF station with saturated downlink traffic. Thus,
the overall collision probability suffered by station i
results 1−(1−pi)(1−τAP ), where τAP is the channel
access probability employed by the AP. Since the
AP is a legacy station, its transmission probability
is not chosen by the AP, but is function of the
perceived collision probability pAP , τAP = f(pAP ),
where f() has been derived in ([7]):
τ = f(p) =

2(1−pR+1)
1−pR+1+(1−p)∑Ri=0 piW (i) 0 ≤ p < 1
2(R+1)
1+
∑R
i=0W (i)
p = 1
(1)
where R is the retry limit employed in the network
and W (i) is the contention window at the ith
retry stage (i.e. W (i) = min{2iCWmin, CWmax}).
We can evaluate the AP collision probability as a
function of the vector strategy τ or as a function of
a generic couple (τi, pi):
pAP = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− τi) = 1− (1− pi)(1− τi)
B. Station Utility
According to the slotted channel scale, the ran-
dom access process can be described as a sequence
of slots resulting in a successful transmission (when
only one station accesses the channel), in a collision
(when two or more stations access the channel),
or in an idle slot (when no station accesses the
channel). By observing that each slot boundary
represents a regeneration instant [21] for the access
process, the throughput of each station can be
readily evaluated as the ratio between the average
number of bits transmitted in each slot and the
average duration of each slot [20].
Assuming that the AP equally shares the down-
link throughput among the stations, we can express
the uplink throughput Siu and the downlink through-
put Sid for the i-th station as [20]:
Siu(τi, pi) =
τi(1− pi)(1− τAP )P
Pidleσ + [1− Pidle]T (2)
Sid(τi, pi) =
1
n
τAP (1− pAP )P
Pidleσ + [1− Pidle]T (3)
where P is the frame payload which is assumed to
be fixed, σ and T are, respectively, the empty and
the busy slot duration1, and Pidle is the probability
that neither the stations, nor the AP transmit on the
channel, i.e. Pidle = (1− pAP )(1− τAP ).
Since the downlink throughput is equal for all the
stations, we can avoid the i superscript in (3). We
1We are implicitly considering a basic access scheme, with
EIFS=ACK Timeout+DIFS, which corresponds to have a fixed busy
slot duration in both the cases of successful transmission and colli-
sion.
4define the utility function Ji for the mobile station
i as:
Ji = min{Siu, kSd} (4)
The rationale of this definition is the assumption
that the station applications can require bandwidth
on both directions. The coefficient k ∈ [0,∞) takes
into account the desired ratio between the uplink
and the downlink throughput. We assume that the
application is the same for all the stations, thus using
a fixed k value for all the utility functions. When
k = 1 all the stations require the same throughput
in both directions. Note that k = ∞ corresponds
to a unidirectional traffic case, in which stations
are not interested in downlink throughput and their
utility is simply given by the uplink throughput (as
assumed in most previous literature). Figure 2 plots
the utility of a given station i for k = 1, in case of
802.11b physical (PHY) layer, P = 1500 bytes, a
data rate equal to 11 Mbps, and an acknowledgment
rate of 1 Mbps. In such a scenario, by including
physical preambles, acknowledgment transmissions,
MAC headers and interframe times, the T duration
is equal to 1667 µs. Different network conditions,
summarized by different values of the pi probability,
have been considered. The collision probability pi
takes into account only the competing mobile sta-
tions, so that the actual collision probability is given
by 1− (1− pi)(1− τAP (pi, τi)). From the figure, it
is evident that, for each pi, the utility is maximized
for a given best response value (e.g. about 0.01 for
p = 0.15), which slightly decreases as pi grows.
We also consider the single variable functions
Shomu (τ) = Su(τ, 1 − (1 − τ)n−1) and Shomd (τ) =
Sd(τ, (1− τ)n−1) representing, respectively, the up-
link and downlink throughput perceived by each
station in case of homogeneous outcomes (τ |τi =
τ, ∀i). Figure 3 plots the utility of a given station
in case of homogeneous outcomes for n = 2 and
n = 10, and for different k values. In these curves
pi = 1−(1−τ)n−1 is not fixed, because the strategy
changes are not unilateral. The optimal strategy,
which maximizes the station utility, is function of
both n and k.
C. Nash Equilibria
We are interested in characterizing Nash Equil-
bria (NE) of our game model where stations achieve
a non-null utility. The inefficient equilibria in which
all stations achieve an utility value equal to 0 can
be easily found by observing that:
Remark 2.1: In general, station i utility is a func-
tion of the whole set of strategies (τ ), but it is
constant and equal to 0 if a) pi = 1, i.e. if at
least one of the other players is transmitting with
probability 1 (∃j 6= i | τj = 1), or if b) τi = 0.
The AP access probability τAP depends on τi and
pi according to (1) and cannot be equal to 1 for
standard contention window values.
Proposition 2.1: The vectors of strategies τ ,
such that ∃ i, j ∈ 1, 2, · · ·n | τi = 1, τj = 1 are NE
of the distributed access game in which all stations
achieve an utility value equal to 0.
Proof: The result is an immediate consequence
of Remark 2.1. If there are at least two stations
transmitting with probability 1, then the channel is
entirely wasted because of collisions and Slu = Sd =
0,∀l. In these conditions, Jl = 0 ∀l and stations are
not motivated in changing their strategies. The equi-
librium strategies are then {(x, 1, 1),x ∈ [0, 1]n−2}.
The following remark will be useful for charac-
terizing more efficient NE.
Remark 2.2: Consider a generic station i and the
collision probability pi ∈ (0, 1) suffered because of
the other station strategies. By derivation, it can be
easily proved that Sd(τi, pi) is a monotonic decreas-
ing function of τi, starting from Sid(0, pi) > 0, and
that Siu(τi, pi) is a monotonic increasing function of
τi, starting from Siu(0, pi) = 0.
Let us consider now the best response strategy
of a station i and denote it by τ (br)i . For k =
∞, the station utility function is equal only to
Siu(τi, pi). From Remarks 2.1 and 2.2, it results
that the utility is maximized for τ (br)i = 1 when
pi < 1, and it is constant to 0 when pi = 1. For
k < ∞, from Remark 2.2 we can state that the
utility Ji is maximized for τ
(br)
i ∈ (0, 1) such that
Siu(τ
(br)
i , pi) = kS
i
d(τ
(br)
i , pi). It follows that τ
(br)
i is
the solution of the following implicit equation:
τ
(br)
i =
kτAP
n−(n−k)τAP =
kf
(
1−(1−pi)
(
1−τ (br)i
))
n−(n−k)f
(
1−(1−pi)
(
1−τ (br)i
)
.
) (5)
It can be shown that the previous equation has a
single solution τ ∗i in the range (0, 1), which can be
numerically solved in a few fixed point iterations.
Proposition 2.2: In case of unidirectional traffic
(i.e. k =∞), the NE of the distributed access game
5with non-null utility values are all and only the vec-
tor of strategies τ , such that ∃! i ∈ 1, 2, · · ·n | τi =
1.
Proof: Being i the index of the single sta-
tion transmitting with probability 1, it follows that
Pidle = 0 and pi 6= 1. Therefore, station i achieves a
non-null uplink rate equal to Siu = P (1 − pi)/T =
Ji. All the other stations achieve Sju = 0 for
j 6= i regardless of their strategy τj . The vectors
of strategies {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1)n−1} are then Nash
Equilibria. Any other vector of strategies τ , such
that τi 6= 1∀i cannot be a NE, since for pi 6= 1, a
generic station i can improve its utility by increasing
its strategy up to τi = 1.
The vectors of strategies {(x, 1),x ∈ [0, 1)n−1}
are not NE for k < ∞. In fact, being pAP = 1 −∏n
h=1(1 − τh) = 1, for these vectors of strategies
the downlink throughput Sd is equal to 0. Thus, the
single station i playing τi = 1 is motivated to reduce
its transmission probability to a value lower than 1,
in order to increase its utility Ji = min{Siu, Sd}.
Proposition 2.3: In case of bidirectional traffic
(i.e. k < ∞), the homogeneous strategy vector
(τ |τi = τ ∗ = kf(1−(1−τ∗)n)n−(n−k)f(1−(1−τ∗)n) ,∀i) is the only
NE with non-null utility values of the distributed
access game.
Proof: The strategy vector (τ ∗, τ ∗, · · · , τ ∗) is
a NE as an immediate consequence of (5) for
pi = 1 − (1 − τ ∗)n−1. In fact the equation can
be read as a mutual best response. Since equation
(5) has a single solution, there exists a unique
homogeneous NE strategy. Since (1− pi)(1− τi) =
(1 − pj)(1 − τj),∀i, j, the right hand of the best
response equation (5) is the same for all the stations.
This excludes the existence of non-homogeneous
Nash equilibria.
The parameter τ ∗, which characterizes the NE
strategy with non-null utility only depends on the
number of stations n and desired ratio k between
uplink and downlink throughput. It is not affected
either by the PHY layer parameters (such as backoff
slot duration, interframe spaces, etc.) or by the
frame length.
D. Social utility
In this section, we try to identify desirable out-
comes from a global point of view. A natural choice
is to look at outcomes that maximize a global utility
function, such as the minimum utility JS(τ ) per-
ceived in the network: min
i=1···n
Ji. This global utility
is often referred to as social utility. The following
remark will be useful for such a characterization.
Remark 2.3: The uplink throughput Shomu (τ) per-
ceived in case of homogeneous outcomes is a non-
monotonic function in τ , with a single maximum
value Shomu (τx), for τx ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 2.4: The social utility is maximized
for an homogeneous outcome (τ ′, τ ′, · · · , τ ′) and
such outcome is Pareto Optimal.
Proof: From the utility definition, we have that
the minimum utility perceived in the network is
given by min{ min
i=1,···n
Siu, kSd}. Therefore, the min-
imum utility can be due to the minimum uplink
throughput or downlink throughput.
We observe that the minimum uplink throughput
is maximized for a homogeneous outcome. In fact,
if τ is a non-homogeneous outcome in A = {x,x ∈
(0, 1)n}, we can prove that the minimum uplink
throughput cannot be maximized. Without loss of
generality, we consider that τ is an ordered vector,
with 0 < τ1 < τ2 < · · · < τn < 1 and S1u(τ1, p1) =
mini S
i
u(τi, pi). Let τ
′
1 be a new strategy for station
1, such that 0 < τ1 < τ ′1 < τ2. For the new outcome
τ ′ = (τ ′1, τ2, · · · τn), the minimum uplink throughput
is still the throughput perceived by station 1. This
throughput is higher than the previous one, since
Siu(τi, pi) is monotonic increasing in τi. It follows
that S1u(τ
′
1, p1) = mini S
i
u(τi, p
′
i) > S
1
u(τ1, p1) =
mini S
i
u(τi, pi). Therefore, τ has to be homoge-
neous.
We also observe that when all the station utilities
are limited by the downlink throughput, i.e. Siu ≥
kSd ∀i, Sd is maximized for an homogeneous
outcome. In fact, a non-homogeneous outcome can-
not maximize Sd, because it is always possible to
increase the AP throughput, by slightly reducing a
given channel access probability τj while maintain-
ing Sju ≥ kSd (i.e. while maintaining τj ≥ τ (br)j ).
We can conclude that the social utility is max-
imized for an homogeneous outcome. For homo-
geneous outcomes (τ |τi = τ, ∀i), the social utility
JhomS (τ) is a single variable function and can be
expressed as min{Shomu (τ), kShomd (τ)}. Being τ ∗
the homogeneous NE strategy for which Shomu (τ) =
kShomd (τ), and τx the homogeneous strategy defined
in remark 2.3, JhomS (τ) has a single maximum in τ
′,
with τ ′ = τ ∗ for τ ∗ ≤ τx, or τ ′ = τx when τx < τ ∗.
6Therefore, JhomS (τ
′) is the maximum social utility
achievable in the network.
Finally, we prove the Pareto optimality. We recall
that a Pareto optimal outcome is one such that
no-one could be made better off by changing the
vector of strategies without making someone else
worse off. Since the homogeneous strategy vector τ ′
maximizes the minimum utility perceived in the net-
work, any other vector of strategies different from
τ ′ will degrade the utility of the station perceiving
the minimum performance. Let τ be an outcome
different from τ ′, with at least a player better
off than in τ ′. This allocation is necessarily non-
homogeneous because, for homogeneous outcomes,
the maximum utility is reached in τ ′. Since for
non-homogeneous outcomes the minimum utility is
lower than JhomS (τ
′), it exists a station j (perceiving
the minimum utility) whose payoff is lower at τ
than at τ ′. It follows that τ ′ is a Pareto outcome.
Figure 3 shows some examples of Jhom(τ), where
the maximum utility value JhomS (τ
′) is limited by the
uplink throughput (i.e. τ ∗ > τx) or by the downlink
one (i.e. τ ∗ ≤ τx). Note that the intersection between
the function Shomu (τ) and the function kS
hom
d (τ)
depends on k. Figure 3 shows that the intersection
strategy τ ∗, for which the utility function has an
abrupt slope change, grows as the k value increases.
Let kx be the value of k for which τ ∗ = τx. For
k ≥ kx, JhomS (τ ′) is equal to Shomu (τ ′) and results
maximized.
Proposition 2.5: If the solution τ ∗ of (5) for pi =
1 − (1 − τ ∗)n−1 is lower or equal to τx, the NE
(τ ∗, τ ∗, · · · τ ∗) is Pareto optimal.
Proof: For τ ∗ ≤ τx, the NE is the homogeneous
outcome that maximizes the minimum network util-
ity. Therefore, from the previous preposition, it is
also Pareto optimal.
Figure 3 shows that the limit condition τ ∗ = τx
is approximately reached for kx = 20 in case of
n = 2, and for kx = 11 in case of n = 10.
For smaller k values, the homogeneous NE τ ∗ is
Pareto optimal. For larger k values, including the
unidirectional traffic case k =∞, the Pareto optimal
outcome τ ′ is not an equilibrium point and the NE
τ ∗ gives poor performance (i.e. performance much
worse than JhomS (τ
′)).
III. CHANNEL ACCESS MECHANISM DESIGN
Our previous considerations about equilibrium
conditions and Pareto optimality have shown that
the global performance of the distributed access
scheme strongly depends on the desired ratio k be-
tween downlink and uplink throughput. In fact, the
station utility perceived in equilibrium conditions
and the maximum social utility depend on k, i.e.
on the intersection point between the curves Shomu
and kShomd . However, such a result is based on
the assumption that the Access Point behaves as
a legacy station. In this section, we explore the
possibility to use the Access Point for changing
the Sd or Su functions, in order to force desired
equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, since the AP plays
the role of gateway to external networks, it can also
play the role of arbitrator for improving the global
performance of its access network.
A. Tuning of the AP channel access probability
A first solution for changing the uplink and
downlink throughput curves is to use the AP channel
access probability τAP as a configuration parameter.
Then, τAP does not depend on τ according to (1),
but it is equal to a fixed value, which can be tuned
by the AP. The best response (5) for all the stations
is equal to
τ+ =
kτAP
n− (n− k)τAP (6)
and the NE in (0, 1)n becomes (τ+, τ+, · · · τ+).
Figures 4 and 5 show the effects of the τAP tuning
on the utility perceived for homogeneous outcomes.
We considered a scenario with 10 contending sta-
tions, a packet size of 1500 byte, and k = 1. Each
labeled curve refers to a different τAP setting, as
indicated in the legend. For each curve, the NE
corresponds to the cuspid point. For comparison,
the figures also plot a bold dashed curve for the
case in which the AP behaves as a legacy station.
Figure 4 has been obtained for an 802.11b PHY
layer at the maximum transmission rate (namely,
11 Mbps). In this case, the utility perceived with a
legacy AP at the NE is about the same perceived
with a fixed τAP = 0.064. However, when the
packet transmission time is shorter, it is possible to
improve the NE utility by opportunistically tuning a
fixed τAP value. Figure 5 has been obtained for an
802.11n PHY layer at the maximum rate (namely,
7600 Mbps). In this case, the difference between the
NE utility perceived under a legacy AP and under
a fixed τAP = 0.168 is about 0.9 Mbps.
Since each different τAP setting leads to a dif-
ferent homogeneous NE, given a desired NE it
is possible to design the corresponding τAP value
by inverting (6). We can express the utility JNE
perceived at the NE as a function of the desired
homogeneous NE (τ, τ, · · · τ). By considering that
at the NE the utility can be expressed as Shomu , (or
equivalently as kShomd ), after some manipulations it
results:
JNE(τ) =
τ(1− τ)nP
T − (1− τ)n+1(T − σ) + n−k
k
Tτ
(7)
Figure 6 plots some examples of the NE utilities
JNE achievable for n = 10, P = 1500 bytes, and
different k values, in the case of 802.11b PHY at
11 Mbps. By deriving (7), it can be shown that, for
k 6= 0, the function JNE has a unique maximum in
τo ∈ (0, 1). Such desired maximum can be obtained
by setting a specific τAPo value. Although an exact
computation of τAPo is in principle possible, by
deriving JNE and inverting (6), an approximated
optimal tuning can be derived as follows. In [7],
it is shown that for a network with N competing
stations the optimal channel access probability is
given by 1
N
√
T/2σ
. In our scenario, at the NE out-
come, the AP downlink throughput corresponds to
the aggregation of n flows, whose bandwidth is a
fraction 1/k of the uplink throughput perceived by
each station. Therefore, we can consider the AP
channel access probability as the aggregation of n/k
flows in a network with n+n/k contending stations.
It follows:
τˆAPo =
n
k
1
(n+ n/k)
√
T/2σ
=
n
(n+ kn)
√
T/2σ
,
(8)
which leads to the desired NE outcome
τˆo =
k
(kn+ n)
√
T/2σ − (n− k) .
Figure 6 visualizes the accuracy of the proposed
approximation by plotting the points (τˆo, JNE(τˆo))
(white boxes) for different k values. The proposed
approximation has an important practical implica-
tion. In fact, by simply specifying the application
requirements k and estimating the number of con-
tending stations n (as described in section IV), the
access point can tune its channel access probability
to τˆAPo , thus forcing the network to the desired
equilibrium point. We also report the NE utilities
perceived under legacy AP (black boxes). Compar-
ing white and black boxes, it is evident that in many
cases the network performance under a legacy AP
are suboptimal (i.e. the NE utility is lower than the
maximum of the JNE curves.
The figure also plots the limit curve obtained
for k → ∞, which represents the system behav-
ior when the application requirements tend to the
unidirectional traffic case. In this case, the JNE
expression given by 7 tends to the uplink through-
put expression. However, this curve is practically
unfeasible because for k → ∞ τAP tends to zero
for any desired NE, and cannot be used as a tuning
parameter. In other words, although τˆo tends to the
finite value 1/(n
√
T/2σ+1) maximizing the social
utility, the mechanism design cannot be practically
performed. When τAP 6= 0, such as in the legacy
case, for k → ∞ the best response of each station
tends to 1 (as shown in the black boxes of figure
6).
B. ACK suppression
The mechanism design described in the previous
section is unfeasible when k =∞. Moreover, when
k is very high (i.e. τAPo tends to zero), stations
need a long estimation time for correctly evalu-
ate their best response. A solution for controlling
the resource repartition in infrastructure networks
with negligible (or zero) downlink throughput is a
selective discard of the ACK transmissions at the
AP side. Since the AP is the common receiver
for all stations, suppressing the ACKs at the AP
side corresponds to triggering ACK timeouts at the
station side, which are interpreted as collisions.
Therefore, the ACK dropping can act as a punish-
ment strategy devised to limit the uplink throughput
of too aggressive stations. We propose the following
threshold scheme: if a generic station i has an access
probability τi higher than the a given value γ, the AP
drops an ACK frame transmission with probability
min{α(τi − γ), 1}.
In this case, by considering τAP = 0 (i.e. the
unidirectional traffic case) or τAP ' 0, the utility
function Ji of a given station i can be expressed as:
8Ji(τi, pi) =

τi(1−pi)
Pidleσ+[1−Pidle]T 0 < τi < γ
τi(1−pi)[1−α(τi−γ)]
Pidleσ+[1−Pidle]T γ ≤ τi < γ + 1/α
0 γ + 1/α ≤ τi ≤ 1
(9)
where we recall that Pidle = (1 − τi)(1 − pi).
According to the previous expression, for τi ≤ γ
the utility function Ji is an increasing function of
τi, while for τi ≤ γ its slope depends on the α
setting. By selecting an α value which corresponds
to a negative derivative for γ < τi < γ + 1/α, the
utility function is maximized for τi = γ.
Figure 7 plots the station utility perceived in case
of homogeneous outcomes, under the ACK suppres-
sion scheme, for n=10 and different α values. For
α = 0, the station utility is simply given by the
uplink throughput. In this case, the utility is an
increasing function of the channel access probability
and the best response of each station is τ (br) = 1.
For α > 0, the utility function is maximized for
τ (br) < 1. Such a maximum corresponds to γ for
large enough values of α (in figure, α = 80).
We can then prove the following result.
Proposition 3.1: The outcome (τ ′|τi = τ ′,∀i) is
a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of the game,
when the ACK suppression scheme indicated above
is implemented with:
γ = τ ′,
α ≥ 1
τ ′(1 + τ ′(−1 + T
T−(T−s)(1−τ ′)n−1 ))
. (10)
Proof: First we observe that τ ′ is a NE. In fact,
whatever player we consider, say it player i, Re-
mark 2.1 guarantees that for τi < τ ′ Ji decreases as
τi decreases. For τ ′ < τi < τ ′+1/α inequality (10)
guarantees that Ji decreases as τi increases until it
does not reach the value 0. For τ > τ ′ + 1/α, the
punishment strategy implies Ji = 0. Then deviating
from τ ′ is not convenient for player i.
Second, τ ′ is the unique point of maximum for
the social utility JhomS (τ). In fact, the social utility
is given by the minimum utility perceived in the
network, which is given by Shomu (τ) in the absence
of punishment. The punishment strategy can only
decrease the social utility for τ ∈ [0, 1]n − [0, τ ′]n
and keeps it unchanged otherwise. Therefore, the
preposition 3.1 holds also under the punishment
strategy and the outcome τ ′ is Pareto optimal.
The utility JNE perceived at the NE can be
simply expressed as the uplink throughput perceived
in case of homogeneous outcome (τ |τi = τ∀i):
JNE(τ) =
τ(1− τ)nP
(1− τ)nσ + (1− (1− τ)n)T (11)
In [7] it is shown that such a function has a unique
maximum for τ ∈ (0, 1), that can be approximated
as:
τo =
1
n
√
T/2σ
(12)
Therefore, by estimating the number of contending
stations n, each AP can implement (as described in
section IV) an ACK suppression scheme that forces
the system to work on the NE τo maximizing the
network throughput.
IV. GAME-BASED MAC SCHEME:
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
On the basis of the results discussed in the
previous sections, we propose some simple DCF
extensions devised to enable each contending sta-
tion to dynamically tune its channel access prob-
ability according to a best response strategy. For
this purpose, each station needs two estimators for
probing the uplink and downlink load conditions. In
fact, station best response depends not only on the
application requirements (by means of k), but also
on the uplink load (by means of n) and downlink
load (by means of τAP ).
We consider both the case in which the AP
behaves as a legacy station, and the case in which
the AP acts as a game designer, for forcing de-
sired equilibrium conditions. In this second case,
we assume that also the AP is able to estimate
the uplink load (by means of n) and the channel
access probability τi employed by each station.
These estimates are then used for opportunistically
tuning the AP channel access probability or the
ACK suppression scheme (by means of γ and α).
A. Network load estimators
In contention-based networks, network load can
be simply related to channel observations. Consid-
ering the slotted channel model due to saturation
conditions, a channel observation corresponds to the
channel outcome observed into a given slot. Such
outcome is given by an idle slot when no station
9transmits, by a successful slot when a single station
transmits, by a collision slot when two or more
stations transmit simultaneously. In order to perform
run-time estimators, the channel observations can
be grouped in regular observation intervals at which
new measurement samples are available. We express
the measurement intervals in terms of an integer
number B of channel slots. Since slot size is uneven
(because successful and collisions slots last for a T
time, while idle slots last only for σ), the actual
time required for a new measurement sample is not
fixed.
For measuring the number of stations actually
contending on the network, we propose to count the
number of different transmitters observed during the
measurement interval [6]. Each transmitter can be
identified by means of its MAC address. Obviously,
the monitoring station can identify the transmitter
address only when the packet is received correctly.
Thus, within B observation slots, the number of
successful packets is not fixed. Let nm(t) be the
uplink load measurement performed during the t-
th measurement interval by a given station. The
estimation nˆ of the number of contending stations
is then performed as:
nˆ(t) = δnˆ(t− 1) + (1− δ)nm(t) (13)
where δ is the filter memory.
The filter performance is critically affected by
the time window B. Indeed, nm is a cumulative
parameter, which does not allow to identify all the
different transmitters summed up to nm. Therefore,
the filter memory is not able to correct a par-
tial counting of the actual number of contending
stations during B. In other words, B has to be
carefully tuned, in order to guarantee a reasonable
probability to catch all the contending stations in
each measurement interval. Consider for example
the case in which n = 4 and B is set to a value
able to include only two successful transmissions.
Assuming that stations 1 and 3 transmit during the
first measurement interval, stations 2 and 4 during
the second one, and so on, the filter will consider
nm(0) = nm(1) = · · ·nm(t) = 2, thus providing a
wrong estimate of n. A solution can be an automatic
tuning of B according to the comparison of mea-
surements performed during different observations
intervals (e.g. B and 2B). In our previous example,
by counting nm during B and during 2B, we find
nm(B, 0) = 2, nm(2B, 0) = 4. Since the measure-
ment performed during 2B is higher than the one
performed during B, the station understands that B
has to be increased. Due to space constraints, we
omit the details of the automatic tuning of B.
In order to measure the channel access probability
employed by the AP, the monitoring station has to
count the number txAP of successful transmissions
performed by the AP during B. Given that there is
no way of understanding which station has transmit-
ted in a collision slot, the station has also to count
the total number of collisions C for measuring the
τmAP (t) parameter in the t-th time interval as
txAP
B−C .
The estimation τˆAP is then performed as:
τˆAP (t) = βτˆAP (t− 1) + (1− β)τmAP (t) (14)
where β is the filter memory. Note that the B setting
is not critical for this estimator.
B. Best response performance under legacy AP
As discussed in section II, in case of unidirec-
tional traffic, the best response strategy leads to
very poor throughput performance under legacy AP.
Therefore, we analyze the case k = ∞ only in
the next subsection, when the AP acts as a game
designer.
For k <∞, a generic station i may implement a
best response strategy, on the basis of the previous
estimators and (5), by setting its channel access
probability to:
τ (br)(t+ 1) =
τˆAP (t)
nˆ(t)− (nˆ(t)− k)τˆAP (t). (15)
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this
scheme (approximating the performance of an ideal
best response in which all stations exactly know
the network load), we run some simulations. We
extended the custom-made C++ simulation platform
used in [7]. We considered an 802.11g physical rate,
with the data rate set to 6Mbps. The contention
windows used by the AP have been set to the
legacy values CWmin = 16 and CWmax = 1024.
All the simulation results have been obtained by
averaging 10 different simulation experiments last-
ing 10s, leading to a confidence interval lower than
3%. Unless otherwise specified, the measurement
interval B has been set to 500 channel slots (which
averagely correspond to 300ms). Figure 8 compares
the behavior of our scheme with standard DCF.
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Each point refers to a network scenario in which n
stations (indicated in the x axis), with an application
requirement k, compete on the channel with a
legacy AP. The aggregated uplink throughput (i.e.
the sum of the throughput perceived by all the mo-
bile stations) and k times the aggregated downlink
throughput, (i.e. the AP throughput) are indicated
by the y axis, respectively by white and black
points. From the figure, it is evident that, as the
number of contending stations increases, standard
DCF gives very poor performance to the downlink
throughput. Conversely, for k = 1 our scheme is
able to equalize uplink and downlink throughput for
each n, and even in congested network conditions.
Moreover, it is also able to maintain the overall
network throughput (i.e. the sum of the aggregated
uplink and downlink throughput) almost indepen-
dent on the network load. For example, for n = 20
the sum of the uplink and downlink throughout
is about 3.8 Mbps for standard DCF and about
5 Mbps for our scheme. The figure also proves
our scheme effectiveness for different application
requirements (i.e. k = 0.5). The figure clearly
visualizes that
∑
i S
i
u = knSd as expected. We
also considered our scheme performance in time-
varying load conditions, by running several simula-
tion experiments in which the number of contending
stations dynamically changes during the simulation
time. Figure 9 shows a simulation example lasting
300 seconds, in which we start with 5 contending
stations, add 5 more stations after 100 seconds and
switch 3 stations off at 200 seconds. In the figure we
plot the throughput perceived by a given reference
station (namely, station labeled as station 1) and
the aggregated throughput perceived by the AP.
The figure also plots the number of active stations
estimated by station 1 on the basis of the load filter
defined in (13), for δ = 0.7 and B = 500 slots. We
can draw some interesting observations. First, the
average AP throughput is basically independent on
the number of stations contending in the network.
This behavior is very different from the standard
DCF behavior, according to which the AP behaves
as a normal station. Second, the station throughput
is approximately equal to the desired ratio, i.e. to
1/n the downlink throughput.
Note also that our scheme is different from a
classical prioritization scheme, such as the schemes
defined in the EDCA extensions. Indeed, by giving
lower contention windows to the AP (i.e. an higher
EDCA priority class to the AP), it is not possible
to perform a desired resource repartition between
uplink and downlink which is also load independent.
Finally, the load estimator gives quite stable results,
because the number of different stations listened in
each temporal window B is always equal to the
total number of contending stations. We can see that
only in the interval between 100 and 200 seconds,
during which we have a number of contending
stations equal to 10, the estimator gives a number
of contending stations lower than the actual one
for two times. In fact, since we are monitoring a
fixed number of slots, as the number of stations
in the network grows, it is more likely that in
some intervals some stations do not succeed in
transmitting on the channel.
C. Best response performance under AP mechanism
design
In order to enable the AP to play the role of
game designer, it is necessary to equip this central
node with different estimation functions. In case of
bidirectional traffic, the AP has to estimate the num-
ber of competing stations n for tuning its channel
access probability to the optimal value given by
(8). For this purpose, the same estimator defined
in (IV-A) can be used at the AP side. We assume
that the application requirement k does not need
to be estimated, because it is known a priori (e.g.
by means of signaling messages). In turns, each
contending station runs an estimator of the AP
channel access probability in order to perform a best
response strategy adjustment according to (6).
Figure 10 shows an example of uplink and down-
link throughput repartition when the AP implements
a mechanism design scheme. The simulation refers
to an experiment lasting 110 seconds, with 10
competing stations, a packet payload of 1500 byte,
an 802.11 PHY layer at 11 Mbps, and k = 0.5.
For comparison, the figure also plots the throughput
repartition perceived under a legacy AP. The figure
shows that the mechanism design implementation
is effective in improving the downlink and uplink
throughput performance. Such an improvement can
be obtained despite of the simplicity of the em-
ployed load estimators.
When k → ∞, the implementation of the ACK
suppression scheme requires that the AP evaluates:
i) the γ threshold, which depends on the estimate of
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n; ii) the α coefficient, which is simply related to
γ and to the PHY parameters T and σ; iii) the per-
station channel access probability τi, i = 1, 2, · · ·n,
which require n estimators similar to the one used
by the stations for evaluating τAP . During the ob-
servation interval B, the AP has to separately count
the successful transmissions txi performed by each
station i, and the number of collisions C, for mea-
suring τmi as txi/(B−C). These measurements can
be filtered with the usual auto-regressive filter. The
implementation of the ACK suppression scheme at
the AP side has important implications for prevent-
ing users and card manufacturers from using non-
standard contention window values. As proved in
[3], currently there is an impressive proliferation of
cheating cards, i.e. cards which implement lower
contention windows for taking advantage during the
contention with other cards.
Figure 11 shows a simulation example (reproduc-
ing one of the realistic scenarios documented in [3]),
in which a cheater card with a contention window
equal to 8 compete with one legacy card. The figure
refers to a simulation experiment lasting 105 sec-
onds, after a transient phase of 10 seconds. Despite
of the temporal fluctuations, it is evident that the
cheating card obtains a throughput (dashed line)
higher than two times the throughput (bold line) per-
ceived by the legacy card. Figure 11 also plots the
throughput performance of the two stations when
the AP implement the ACK suppression scheme. In
this case, the cheater is no longer motivated to use a
channel access probability higher than the contend-
ing station, since its throughput is maximized tuning
the channel access probability to the threshold value
1/2
√
T/2σ (i.e. implementing a best response strat-
egy). The figure shows the throughput performance
of the two stations implementing the best response
(bold and dashed lines labeled as best response), and
the throughput degradation perceived by the cheater
station by still using a contention window equal to 8.
The ACK suppression scheme works properly, even
if the AP relies on the channel access probability
estimators, rather than on the actual values.
In order to asses the effectiveness of the ACK
suppression implementation as the number of com-
peting stations grows, figure 12 compares the ag-
gregated network throughput of our scheme with
the standard DCF one, for different n values. Each
point refers to a network scenario in which n
stations (indicated in the x axis) are aware of the
ACK suppression risk and employ a consequent best
response strategy. Although the variance of the τi
estimators could imply that in some intervals such a
probability passes the threshold value (i.e. there is a
non null probability of unnecessary ACK dropping),
the figure shows that the aggregated throughput
is almost constant regardless of the number of
competing stations. This behavior is very different
from standard DCF, whose efficiency depends on
the number of contending stations and degrades for
high load conditions. Therefore, our scheme is able
not only to discourage cheating card behaviors, but
also to optimize the global network performance.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The proliferation of MAC-level programmable
WiFi cards can potentially create serious coexis-
tence problems, since some stations can implement
greedy access policies for increasing their band-
width share at the expenses of compliant users. For
this reason, we proposed a game-theoretic analysis
of persistent access schemes for WiFi infrastructure
networks, in order to characterize equilibria con-
ditions and to design disincentive mechanisms for
inefficient behaviors. We proved that, when stations
are interested in both uploading and downloading
traffic, an homogeneous Nash Equilibrium arises,
where all the stations reach the same non-null
utility. Moreover, we also explored the utilization
of the Access Point as an arbitrator for improving
the global network performance. Specifically, we
proposed two different solutions. When the required
download traffic is different from zero, the AP
can simply tune its channel access probability for
controlling the station best response. When the
downlink traffic is zero (or negligible), the AP
can selectively discard the acknowledgments of too
greedy stations.
We proposed some extensions to standard DCF,
in order to i) estimate the network status, and ii)
emulate an access scheme based on best response
strategies and AP mechanism design. We proved
the effectiveness of our solutions for controlling
the resource sharing in WiFi networks in various
network scenarios. We are currently investigating
on the prototyping of our solutions in actual WiFi
cards and APs. While the estimate and best response
modules can be simply implemented at the driver
level, the ACK dropping scheme requires a hard-
ware/firmware update.
12
REFERENCES
[1] IEEE Standard 802.11 - 1999; Wireless LAN Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications;
November 1999.
[2] Wi-Fi Alliance, www.wi-fi.org
[3] G. Bianchi, A. Di Stefano, C. Giaconia, L. Scalia, G. Ter-
razzino, I. Tinnirello, “Experimental assessment of the backoff
behavior of commercial IEEE 802.11b network cards”, Proc.
of IEEE Infocom 2007, May 2007, Anchorage, pp. 1181-1189.
[4] S.W. Kim, B.S. Kim, Y. Fang, “Downlink and uplink resource
allocation in IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs”, Proc. of IEEE Conf.
on Vehicular Technology, Jan. 2005, Dallas, vol. 54, pp. 320-
327.
[5] IEEE 802.11e Supplement to Part 11: Wireless Medium Access
Control (MAC) and Physical Layer Specification: Medium
Access Control (MAC) Enhancements for Quality of Service
(QoS)”, October 2005.
[6] L. Zhao, L. Cong, H. Zhang, W. Ding, J. Zhang, “Game-
Theoretic EDCA in IEEE 802.11e WLANs”, Proc. of IEEE
VTC 2008, Sept. 2008, pp. 1-5.
[7] G. Bianchi, “Performance Analysis of the IEEE 802.11 Dis-
tributed Coordination Function”, IEEE Journal of Selected
Areas in Communication, vol. 18, no. 3, pp.535-547, March
2000.
[8] L. Giarre´, I. Tinnirello, and G. Neglia, “Medium Access in WiFi
Networks: Strategies of Selfish Nodes”, IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine (SPM), vol. 26, issue 5, pp. 124-127, 2009.
[9] J. Konorski, “A Game-Theoretic study of CSMA/CA under a
backoff attack”, IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 14, issue
6, pp. 1167-1178, 2006.
[10] M. Cagalj, S. Ganeriwal, I. Aad, J.P. Hubaux, “On selfish
behavior in CSMA/CA networks”, Proc. of IEEE Infocom,
March 2005, Miami, vol. 4, pp. 2513-2524.
[11] L. Chen, S.H. Low, J. Doyle, “Contention Control: A Game-
Theoretic Approach”, Proc. of IEEE Conf. On Decision and
Control, Dec. 2007, New Orleans, pp. 3428-3434.
[12] T. Cui, L. Chen, S. Low, “A Game-Theoretic framework for
medium access control”, IEEE JSAC, vol. 26, issue 7, pp. 1116-
1127, 2008.
[13] G. Zhang, H. Zhang, “Modeling IEEE 802.11 DCF in wireless
LANs as a dynamic game with incompletely information”,
Proc. of Conf. on Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks,
Jan. 2008, Mumbai, pp. 215-218.
[14] L. Chen, J. Leneutre, “Selfishness, not always a nightmare:
modeling selfish MAC behaviors in wireless mobile ad-hoc
networks”, Proc. of IEEE ICDCS 2007, June 2007, pp. 16-23.
[15] D.K. Sanyal, M. Chattopadhyay, S. Chattopadhyay, “Improved
performance with novel utility functions in a game-theoretic
model of medium access control in wireless networks”, Proc.
of IEEE TENCON 2008, Nov. 2008, pp. 1-6.
[16] I. Tinnirello, L. Giarre´ and G. Neglia, “The Role of the Access
Point in Wi-Fi Networks with Selfish Nodes”, Proc. of IEEE
GameNets, Instanbul, pp. 632-637, 2009.
[17] L. Giarre´, G. Neglia and I. Tinnirello “Resource sharing opti-
mality in WiFi infrastructure networks”, IEEE Proc. of CDC,
Shangai, 2009.
[18] G. Bianchi, I. Tinnirello, “A Kalman filter estimation of the
number of competing terminals in an IEEE 802.11 network”,
Proc. of IEEE Infocom, April 2003, San Francisco, vol.2, pp.
844-852
[19] L. Giarre´, G. Neglia and I.Tinnirello, “Performance analysis of
selfish access strategy on WiFi infrastructure networks”, IEEE
Proc. of Globecom, Hawaii, 2009.
[20] G. Bianchi, I. Tinnirello “Remarks on IEEE 802.11 Perfor-
mance Analysis”, IEEE Communication Letters, Vol. 9, no. 8,
August 2005.
[21] D.R. Cox, “Renewal Theory”, Methuen and Co., 1970.
13
A ACK A+B
DCF operation
busy
A) 4   3    2    1   0                                  3    2   1    0                                   2…
B)  8   7    6    5   4                                  3    2   1    0                              4…
busy A A+B
A) A=1/5
B) B=1/10
Persistent slotted model
Fig. 1. An example of DCF operation and equivalent slotted model.
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Fig. 2. Utility of a given station i, for different pi values, as a
function of the strategy τi (k = 1).
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Fig. 4. Station utility at 11 Mbps in case of homogeneous access
probability, n=10, k=1, and different τAP values.
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Fig. 5. Station utility at 600 Mbps in case of homogeneous access
probability, n=10, k=1, and different τAP values.
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Fig. 7. Station utility in case of ACK suppression, for n=10, k=∞
and different α values.
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